could channel grants towards their favored research labs or their own pet disease causes, drifting implementation from what politicians would want if they were as well informed as the agency officials. Without knowing the agencies' preferences and their evaluation of the technical merits of funding options, it is difficult to specify the location where funding is more likely to occur within the broader range of options available to them. What can instead be specified, however, is that independent agencies can use the broader range of options to implement policy with what appears from the outside to be a higher degree of variability. Agency structure can thus have two consequences for how funding programs are administered. Agencies structured for political control will be more likely to make awards in the districts of politically powerful and demanding politicians, while also having a smaller range of options from which to select policies to implement.
In this paper, we present an empirical strategy for identifying both of these effects of agency structure on the implementation of federal distributive policy. The data are a panel of US distributive program awards made by federal agencies from 1983 to 2002, measures of agency structure (Lewis 2003; 2008) , and other controls. We first examine whether distributive program spending in agencies structured for political influence is more sensitive to elected politicians' political circumstances than spending in agencies structured for more independence, such as whether politically pliable agencies channel more distributive program awards to the districts represented by politicians facing close elections. We then examine whether more independent agencies show wider variance in their distributive spending, conditional on the modeled mean from the first analysis. Independent agencies may probabilistically choose policies across the broader range of options available to them, whether these choices are motivated by the agency's own policy preferences or by its technical policy assessments. The emphasis on variability in distributive spending means that we need not empirically distinguish between these motivations. , Across several model specifications, agency structure consistently has imperceptible influence on agencies' responsiveness to elected politicians, but it significantly increases the range of options from which agencies implement distributive spending policy. The correlations between measures of politicians' political circumstances and agencies' distributive policy spending in their congressional districts are no stronger for agencies structured for political influence than for agencies structured for independence. However, the variance of distributive policy spending is greater for agencies structured for independence than for those structured for control. Together, these results suggest that agency structure is a way of adjusting agency independence by structuring the range of options from which agencies can choose to administer policy rather than by making agencies responsive to individual elected politicians.
Our paper offers important contributions to public administration research. First, the paper shows that agency independence can have two implications for how agencies implement policy:
agencies' ability to resist demands from political overseers and their ability to select policies to implement from a broad range of politically acceptable options. Second, the paper offers an analytic strategy for identifying both of these discretionary effects in a broad range of research settings. An advantage of this approach is that it identifies the consequences of discretion without needing to sort out whether decisions were based on administering agencies' technical assessments or policy preferences, which is a vexing challenge in just about any empirical setting. Third, the paper's findings suggest that, aside from responsiveness to politicians' demands, agencies use discretion to pursue policies of their own choice, whether based on their own policy preferences or technical expertise. The next section offers a more detailed theoretical rationale in the context of the literature on agency structure and distributive spending. The paper then presents the data and analytic techniques, results, and conclusion. Politicians delegate increased discretion when agencies' expertise is more valuable, such as when a policy problem is more complex (Ringquist, Wrosham, and Eisner 2003) and reduce discretion 1 Beyond agency structure, other factors influence the level of agency autonomy, including reputation (Carpenter 2001), policy issue salience and the political environment (Lavertu 2012; Carpenter and Krause 2015) , and conflict among political overseers (Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999) . We limit our discussion to agency structure since we do not address these other sources empirically; our analyses control for these effects using agency fixed effects and other empirical approaches.
, when their political costs of agency drift are greater, such when a policy is more politically salient or conflictual (Lavertu 2012; Whitford 2005 ).
The consequences of agency structure for how agencies implement policy has received less empirical scrutiny (but see e.g., Waterman 1991, 1993; Whitford 2014 , Woods 2015 , most likely because of the challenges of measuring the degree of independence delegated across different agencies and, perhaps more importantly, of deploying an empirical strategy for identifying the effects of agency structure on how agencies implement policy.
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This paper takes up these challenges. First, we develop a theoretical rationale for how agency structure shapes the degree of independence with which agencies implement policies. Second, we offer an empirical analysis that identifies the effect of agency structure on political responsiveness directly and on the range of policy options available to the agency.
Agency Structure and Policy Outcomes
There is a rich literature on the conditions under which politicians design agencies for more or 3 Considerable research shows that politicians use agency structure to influence future agency behavior and to manage the tradeoff between agency expertise and responsiveness (e.g., Moe 1989 , Bawn 1995 , Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond, 2001 Gailmard and Patty 2012) .
, and Selin 2014; Berry, Burden, and Howell 2010) . Politicians may exert more influence when agencies' decisions are more valuable to them, such as when facing a challenging election (Bickers and Stein 1996, 2000) . Politicians may likewise exert more influence over agencies when they have more political authority. For example, a legislative committee chair may have more influence over agencies under her jurisdiction.
Second, agencies structured for independence may have a broader range of options from which to choose policies. Of course, an agency might use its discretion to choose policies from a narrow band of the broader range available to it, resulting in a more homogeneous set of policies.
However, across a large number of agencies making many policy choices, the broader range of policy options available to more independent agencies should on average show more heterogeneous policies. Agency structure can affect an agency's range of policy options by heading it with a board or commission or by placing limitations on the type of person who can serve as its leader.
Theories of agency structure suggest two dimensions of agency independence: the degree to which agencies respond to external political influence and the range of options from which they can select policy to implement (see Bawn 1995; Gailmard and Patty 2012) . From this we derive two propositions that inform our empirical analyses. The first is that agencies' policy output varies based on the signals it receives from politicians, conditional on the degree to which the agency has been structured for political responsiveness. The second empirical proposition addresses the fact that agency structure can affect the range of policy options from which the agency can select a policy to implement. From politicians' perspectives, agency drift occurs when agencies' policy outputs differ from what is targeted by the combined effects of the legislative mandate and political demands, with larger differences indicating that the agency had a larger , discretionary range from which to choose policy. The size of the range is a function of agency structure for political responsiveness.
Agency Structure and Distributive Policy
Federal distributive program spending in the United States is an ideal setting for studying the effects of agency structure on policy implementation. There are thousands of grant programs across the US federal government, covering diverse policy areas such as health research, transportation infrastructure, education, and the environment. The demands of public office leave politicians without the time and expertise to identify which levees need repair, which businesses need loans, and so on. Instead, elected politicians establish via statute the broad aims for distributive programs and then delegate authority for making specific awards to agencies with expertise to better identify the most suitable recipients. At the same time, elected politicians can sometimes have stronger incentives to influence how specific agencies spend distributive funds (Stein 1981, Levitt and Snyder 1997) , as demonstrated by empirical research on how elected politicians influence distributive spending in the United States. Comparing how independent and politically controlled agencies respond to legislators' political circumstances provides insights into how agency structure conditions responsiveness.
Distributive spending by agencies structured for such influence should be more strongly correlated with politicians' political circumstances than spending by independent agencies. Higher distributive program spending is also correlated with citizens' needs and demands, as reflected by district demographics (Arnold 1979; Bickers and Stein 1996, 2000; Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Hird 1991; Lee and Oppenheimer 1999; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Potoski and Talbert 2000; Rich 1989 ) and strength of organized interests (Lowry and Potoski 2004) .
6 Here we do not consider the ideology of the member of Congress or agency, but congruence between these has also been shown to increase grants (Bertelli and Grose 2009 We also report several specification checks, including fixed and random effects and different measures of agency independence. All in all, our analytic approach offers several important advantages over previous agency design and distributive policy research: a large sample of panel data, variation in agency structure and political circumstances, and an analytic approach that uses interaction terms and conditional variance coefficients to assess two outcomes of agency independence.
,
Estimation Methods
The analyses are based on linear regression with multiplicative conditional heteroskedasticity estimated via full information maximum likelihood (Harvey 1976) . This procedure estimates both the mean and variance of a dependent variable conditional on independent variables. Such techniques are useful for uncovering circumstances where the variance of a dependent variable depends on exogenous factors. For example, the variability of citizens' attitudes on contentious issues may depend on how well they are informed (Alvarez and Brehm 2002). Our empirical model regresses the number of distributive program awards from an agency to a district on the independent variables and interaction terms in order to assess whether the effect of political variables is conditional on the agency structure, shown as equation 1.
where subscript i indexes congressional districts, subscript j indexes agencies, and subscript t indexes congresses. represents a matrix of political characteristics measuring conditions where the district's representative would have more ability or effective demand to steer distributive program awards to her district, such as her seniority, committee assignment, or political vulnerability. is a measure of agency independence. While we do not see any obvious theoretical reason to believe that the number of awards is a direct function of agency structure, we include it in the empirical model as a main effect in order to estimate the interaction terms, which are of interest. is a vector of controls composed of district characteristics. The coefficients α and in , , and represent respectively the constant and direct effects of political characteristics, agency independence, and controls on distributive program awards. The control variables include measures of districts' demand and ability to procure distributive program awards, including wealth, education and other demographics. , the vector of coefficients on the interaction terms, , indicate whether the structure chosen affects the degree to which the agency is responsive to political factors. The intuition behind this modeling approach is that the coefficients α and in , , and together capture how politicians direct agencies to implement policy, whether through legislative mandate or through the amount they respond to political signals net of the insulating effects of agency structure, which are captured via . is the error term which takes the form of equation 2.
with notations the same as equation 1. is once again a measure of agency independence. The coefficients ϑ and γ represent the constant and the coefficient for agency independence. The intuition behind this modeling approach is that a larger variance means that agencies are choosing policies with more independence from the political influences captured in equation 1. This specification allows us to assess whether the variance in agency policies is greater when the agency is more insulated, with a positive coefficient indicating greater variance among more independent agencies (e.g., Huber and Shipan 2002). After performing the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge 2002) , we can reject the null hypothesis of no firstorder autocorrelation, which is not surprising given the nature of distributive spending data. The results include models with and without a lagged dependent variable. Equations 1 and 2 were estimated in Stata using the regh command.
We also conducted alternative analyses to see if the results are sensitive to modeling assumptions. Since the control variables may not account for all observable factors influencing distributive program spending, such as actors' capacity to work collaboratively to procure grants, we estimated models using fixed and random effects to account for unmeasured characteristics of the agency-district pair within a redistricting period that might otherwise lead to omitted variable , bias.
7
This identification strategy accounts for factors such as interest group strength and the presence of major research universities that might influence distributive program grants as well as unobservable factors in the relationship between an agency and a district. This means, of course, that we cannot estimate a coefficient for independence in the first stage because it does not vary within the district-decade-agency groupings and is captured via the fixed effects, but we can still estimate the interaction term coefficients to see if the effects of political circumstances vary with agency structure, which is our primary interest. We also estimated random effects analyses, which can include both the interaction terms and their components. A disadvantage of both fixed and random effects approaches is that software procedures have not been developed for jointly estimating equations 1 and 2 with fixed and random effects. For both these models, we adopt the less efficient but asymptotically equivalent approach of first estimating equation 1 and then using its squared residuals to estimate equation 3.
Since the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial autocorrelation again suggests that there is serial autocorrelation, we use fixed and random effects GLS models with AR(1) disturbances. We note the important findings and where the results differ substantially from the estimates in the multiplicative heteroskedasticity estimation. The overall pattern of results persists across different estimation approaches.
7 We include decade in the panel variable of district-decade-agency to account for redistricting that occurs each decade. As a result, a district may not be comparable from decade to decade. ,
Data
Our policy data are a panel of distributive awards in U.S. congressional districts from 68 agencies over 10 Congresses (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) This is largely because the marginal credit claiming value of additional dollars declines, holding number of awards constant. As a check of this assumption, we also test an alternative specification using the dollar value of awards from agencies to districts, excluding contingent liability programs. The results are similar to our main results and reported in the Appendix.
The distributive programs were matched to David Lewis' data on agency structure and political appointments in US federal agencies created between 1946 and 1997 (Lewis 2003 The dependent variable is quite skewed, with many zeros and some very large values. Normally, we would use a log transform under these circumstances. However, a log transform can create a spurious relationship between variance and independence if more independent agencies give more awards (which they do). Therefore, we present results with a logged dependent variable only as a robustness check in the appendix. Results are substantially the same when the dependent variable is logged and are discussed below.
9 Counting the number of awards also allows us to include contingent liability programs such as loan guarantees and insurance, which are favored by Republicans (Bickers and Stein 2000). These awards have monetary value to recipients, but their dollar value recorded in the FAADS system is not directly comparable to cash awards. For a more complete discussion, see Bickers and Stein (1996) , Lowry and Potoski (2004) . Also, following Stein and Bickers (1996) and others, we exclude programs distributed by formula and those whose eligible recipients are restricted only to governments or individuals, as reported in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
, 2008). Sixty-eight agencies administering over 600 distributive programs appeared in both the FAADS data and Lewis agency data. Among districts that receive awards, the average number of new awards from an agency is 36. However, many districts receive no awards from a program.
Out of approximately 274,000 district-agency-congress groups, about 47,000 receive at least one award and the mean number of awards is six. Lewis's (2003 Lewis's ( , 2008 data is designed to measure independence from the president; it inevitably also captures independence of agencies from the legislative branch as well. For example, an agency headed by a board or commission is more likely to be insulated from Congress, as well as the president.
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Lewis offers two approaches to measuring agency independence. The first assesses each agency on six major aspects of independence: whether the agency is headed by a board or commission, whether the new agency is independent (created outside of existing bureaucratic structure), whether the administrator serves for a fixed term, how long that term is, whether there are limitations on the type of persons who can be appointed to head the agency, and the agency's proximity to the president. Further details on the coding scheme can be found in Lewis's codebook, posted at https://my.vanderbilt.edu/davidlewis/.
Second, Lewis (2008) offers data on the percentage of political appointees in an agency, which may affect responsiveness (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006) . This is measured by the number of presidential appointees over the number of career-level SES managers within an agency (Lewis 2008). To keep the analyses more tractable, we use principal factor analysis to collapse these variables into a summary measure of agencies' degree of independence. This summary variable captures 89% of the variance in the underlying descriptions of agency independence.
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One factor captures 90% of the variance in the structural variables, when the political appointees 10 Selin (2015) expands on these measures of independence, but we believe these capture enough variation to allow testing of the relationship between agency structure and policy outcomes.
, variable is kept separate. Since including both ordinal and continuous data in factor analysis can be problematic, we also estimate the latent insulation using Bayesian factor analysis for mixed ordinal and continuous data following Quinn (2004) . The resulting factor is correlated at 0.91 with the factor estimated via principal components, so we maintain the simpler principal components version and offer robustness checks that separate out the structural variables ( Table 1 shows some of the agencies and their independence scores.
The remaining important independent variables fall into two categories: variables that describe the political conditions of the district and variables that describe the characteristics of the districts' representatives in Congress. The key variables describing district political conditions are the legislator and presidential vote margins in the district. We include the winning congressional candidate's vote share in the prior election as a measure of the safety of the congressional district and the safety of the seat for the incumbent president using the absolute value of the difference between 0.5 and the share of the vote going to the Democratic candidate in the prior election. To measure the political power of the member of Congress representing the district, we include seniority in Congress, majority party membership, whether she is a Democrat, whether she is a freshman, whether she serves on the Appropriations or Ways and Means Committees, whether she is a committee chair or ranking member, and whether she is a party 11 The first factor has an eigenvalue of 4.57, after which all subsequent eigenvalues are below one. This suggests that one factor is sufficient.
, leader. To assess the effects of agency structure, the analyses include interaction terms between the agency independence measures and the district and representative characteristics. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the variables in the model.
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We do not include an interaction between party and independence, since we have no reason to expect that agencies would be more responsive to one party that the other. We do include the main effect of party, since Democrats may be more likely to receive more awards.
, Table 1 presents the results of multiplicative conditional heteroskedasticity full information maximum likelihood analyses of the effects of agency structure on agency discretion in administering distributive program awards (the demographic controls from these analyses are reported in Table 2 to conserve space). The analysis reported in Column 1 does not include a lagged dependent variable, while the analysis in Column 3 does. Tables 1 & 2 about here In Table 1 , the effects of the political variables on the mean level of distributive program awards in districts are generally in line with theoretical expectations and previous research. In both specifications, districts that are safer for the president receive fewer awards, while the specifications differ as to whether safer congressional seats receive fewer awards (perhaps because the measures of independence better capture independence from the president). And in both, Democrats receive more awards and districts with larger state delegations receive fewer awards. Results for the rest of the political variables are generally in the expected direction, even when they do not reach statistical significance at the 95% level. More independent agencies give, on average, more awards. These results suggest that our empirical model is a plausible representation of the distribution of awards, as they are consistent with prior findings.
To test the theoretical expectations about how agency structure affects responsiveness to political principals, we first examine the interaction terms, which estimate whether independent agencies are less responsive to political signals. Significant interaction terms with the opposite sign of the main effects would indicate that agencies with more independent structures are less responsive to political signals. ‡ indicates that the null hypothesis that the linear combination of the interaction and main effect is equal to zero can be rejected with a p-value of less than 0.05.
,
The coefficients on the interaction terms generally do not reach conventional levels of significance. None of the interaction term coefficients are statistically significant in the hypothesized direction consistently across the models. The linear combination is significant in both specifications for safety of the president, suggesting that independent agencies are even less likely to give awards to districts that are safe for the president. In contrast to some prior research (e.g., Hudak 2014), the fact that few of the interaction terms are significant in the expected direction suggests that being structured for independence does not make agencies less responsive to political demands for allocating distributive program awards to congressional districts. We hesitate to make a strong claim that insulated agencies do not respond at all differently to politicians, particularly presidents (e.g., in election years per Kriner and Reeves 2015), but we emphasize that the variability remaining after this estimation captures the available range of choices left to the agency.
The second way that agency structure can affect policy implementation is by constraining the range of policy options available to the agency, which in our analyses would be associated with lower variance in distributive program spending across districts. The variance results at the bottom of Table 1 show that independent agencies have a wider range of options from which to choose in administering policy. Across both specifications, agency independence is positively Table 2 shows that the control variables measuring district demographics generally conform to expectations. Districts with lower per capita income, more education, more minorities, more rural populations, and more white collar jobs receive more awards. 
Alternate Specifications
We conducted three groups of alternative specifications. The first uses fixed and random effects because the main models may be misspecified by failing to account for heterogeneity across congressional districts and agencies. Table 3 replicates Equation 1 while replacing the district and agency variables with random (Column 1) and fixed (Column 3) effects for district-agencydecade. Both models have AR(1) error terms. We then took the squared residuals from these models and used them with Equation 3 to estimate the effect of agency structure on the variance of distributive program awards. These variance results are presented in Table 4 . The results from the random and fixed effects analyses are similar to the main model results. The interaction terms do not display a consistent pattern of results that would indicate that more insulated agencies are more immune to political demands; their coefficients are generally not statistically significant and the significant coefficients are often counter to the hypothesized sign. In the random effects 13 When these demographics are included in the variance portion of the estimation, the results are substantially the same. The significant positive relationship between independence and the variability in awards remains. Three of the nine demographics (proportion black, proportion rural, and proportion white collar) are significantly related to variability.
, model, two of the 11 interaction terms have p-values less than 0.05, but only one of these has a pvalue of less than 0.05 in the fixed effects model (and then the sign is opposite). None of the linear combinations are significantly different from zero across both specifications. Agency structure does not appear to change agencies' responsiveness to political demands. Once again agency independence is significantly associated with increased variance in the awards in Table 4 .
Instead of making agencies less responsive to their political principals, independence appears to
give them more latitude in distributing awards across districts once political considerations are taken into account.
Tables 3 & 4 about here
The second group of specification checks investigates whether the main model results are sensitive to different approaches to measuring agency structure. We repeated the analyses in Tables 1 and 2 14 The structural factor and the percentage of political appointees are significantly associated with variability (or reduced variability in the case of the percentage of political appointees, which measures lack of independence), both when they are entered together and when they are entered separately. To briefly summarize the results from the components of the factor separately, in four of the seven specifications, the individual measure of agency structure had a statistically significant effect in the expected direction in the variance equation. The coefficients are reported in Table 5 . Being created independent of existing 14 We do not include party balancing because it does not have enough variability to be entered separately.
, bureaucratic structure, having limitations on the type of administrator, being further from the president, and having fewer political appointees are all associated with greater variability in the distribution of awards. Commissions, agencies with fixed terms, and with longer term lengths are associated with lower variability, perhaps because there is more continuity among agency heads in these cases. In the mean equations, the individual agency structure variables had only a few interaction term coefficients that were both statistically significant and in the expected direction.
Across all of these models (full results in Appendix Tables A3, A4 , and A5), the overall pattern of results persists; agency structure does not consistently condition agencies' responsiveness to external political signals. Instead, agencies designed to be more independent generally exhibit more variance in distributive spending and agencies with fewer political appointees exhibit more
variance. In the model with political appointees only, there is more evidence less independent agencies are more responsive to their political principals, as the interaction terms are more often significant and in the hypothesized direction. Table 5 about here
The third group of specification checks investigates whether the main model results change when using the logged number of awards or distributive program district expenditures as the dependent variable in place of the number of awards (Appendix Tables 4 and 5 ).
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Again, the results, particularly the variance results, are substantially the same as the main models.
Independence results in more policy variability, both in terms of the number of awards that they
give to each district and the amount of those awards. These robustness checks give confidence that the results are not a function of the measure of independence that we use or something peculiar about the number of awards as the dependent variable.
15 Recall that the dependent variable is quite skewed. ,
Conclusion
Agency structure can influence how agencies implement distributive spending programs. In this paper, we examine the effects of agency structure on distributive program implementation through analyses of 68 government agencies implementing distributive programs. Our analyses show that agencies designed to be insulated, such as those with fewer political appointees and more independence from elected politicians, have more variability in their distributive program spending across congressional districts, suggesting that these agencies enjoy a broader range of options from which to select policy to implement. At the same time, our analyses uncover little evidence that agencies' structure influences their responsiveness to demands for distributive spending expressed from individual politicians. Agencies designed for independence allocate distributive program spending in the same way as agencies designed for political control. To be clear, we do find that, consistent with previous research, politicians influence agencies' distributive program spending, such as by increasing awards to competitive districts. Yet we do not find that this influence varies across agencies based on their structure. Independent agencies, in other words, are just as responsive to external political demands, such as politicians' electoral circumstances and committee assignments, perhaps because strategic actors within the agency find it useful to keep political overseers satisfied and to exert their independence via the wider range of policy options available to them.
Our paper contributes to the study of relations between government agencies and their elected political overseers. Agency structure can be an effective tool for shaping agency independence and managing the tradeoffs between agency and political control. Although there is evidence that agency structure affects responsiveness to elected politicians, very little research has investigated whether agency structure shapes the range of policy options available to the agency. This paper , presents an analytic approach for examining both effects within the same research setting, allowing a better understanding of the extent of electoral accountability that is governed by the relationship between agencies and elected officials.
The findings in this paper raise directions for future research. The analytic approach outlined in this paper is sufficiently flexible to be applied in different political and policy contexts and does not require measuring difficult concepts like information asymmetry between politicians and agencies, the complexity of the policy problem, or agencies' political preferences. Table 3 . * p<0.05. Tables A4 and A5 , except % Political Appointees in Appendix Table A3. , Table 2 , but omitted here for space. Robust standard errors. ‡ indicates that a test of whether linear combination fo the interaction and main effect is equal to zero has p-value of less than 0.05. , ,
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